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A part of the Seila Law and the Roberts Court series.
n the last Supreme Court term, the Court ruled in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau that Article II of the U.S. Constitution and separation of
powers prohibit Congress from shielding the Bureau’s director from termination
except for cause. Seila Law has natural implications for the CFPB’s independence
(although the magnitude of that effect is unclear). More troubling, Seila Law could open
up the financial system to destabilization by paving the path for a full-scale assault on the
traditional independence of federal financial regulators and presidential manipulation of
the economy.
Agency independence for federal financial regulators is a cherished historical tradition
and a cultural norm. That independence protects the U.S. economy from unwise
interference by the president for short-term political gain. When Congress authorized the
creation of the CFPB in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, it reaffirmed that long-standing
tradition by constituting the Bureau as “an independent bureau.” 
This independent agency status plays a critical role by giving the CFPB the breathing
room it needs to act in the best long-term interest of the economy. It helps the Bureau
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resist political pressure from the president, moneyed interests, and Congress to relax
credit restrictions and stimulate the economy in order to boost politicians’ election
prospects, with no regard for the risk of loan defaults further down the road. In this way,
agency independence is intrinsic to long-term financial stability.
Seila Law erodes independent agency protections in the worst possible way, by
enshrining its ruling as constitutional command. The constitutional basis of that ruling
ossifies the law on independent agency safeguards and means Congress and the
president cannot overturn it. The decision further exposes the CFPB, and possibly other
federal financial regulators, to political strong-arming to chase short-term gains at
potential expense to long-term financial stability. In the process, Seila Law damages the
important ballast of economic health that agency independence provides.
I. The Seila Holding Recapped
The events culminating in Seila Law date back to July 2010 and the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank was Congress’s landmark response to the 2008 financial
crisis and the ensuing economic carnage. Chief among the Act’s achievements was the
creation of a new federal banking regulator, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Consistent with congressional tradition for all federal banking regulators, Congress
designated the CFPB as an “independent bureau” and conferred it with guarantees of
agency independence. One of those guarantees was a director appointed by the
president for a five-year term. Seila Law challenged Congress’s accompanying
stipulation that the president could only fire the director of the Bureau for “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” and not at will.
In 2017, the CFPB, under the helm of Obama appointee Richard Cordray, issued a civil
investigative demand (CID) to Seila Law, LLC, a California-based law firm providing debt
relief and related services. The purpose of the demand was to ascertain whether the firm
had “engag[ed] in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt
relief services.” 
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Seila Law contested the demand, arguing that Congress’s decision to confer the Bureau
with a single director who was only terminable for cause violated separation of powers.
After the law firm refused to comply with the CID, the CFPB sued to enforce the demand.
In federal district court, the Bureau prevailed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Seila Law
then successfully sought Supreme Court review. In the High Court, the CFPB, by then
led by Trump appointee Kathy Kraninger, agreed that the CFPB’s structure was
unconstitutional, but maintained that the for-cause removal provision was severable,
rendering the CID enforceable.
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John
Roberts held that the combination of a single agency director and termination only for
“inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance” violated Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Justice
Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia
Sotomayor, dissented from that ruling, but concurred, along with Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh, that the constitutionally infirm provision
was severable. Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissented on the issue of
severability. The Court remanded the case for determination of whether the CFPB had
validly ratified the CID.
Chief Justice Roberts grounded the majority’s constitutional analysis in the “take care”
clause of Article II, which vests “[t]he executive Power . . . in a President,” and
commands the president to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Although the
Constitution nowhere has a removal clause, the majority reasoned that presidents cannot
discharge the duty to “take care” unless they have the ability to remove appointees for
any reason or none. Invoking history, the majority argued that the CFPB’s single-director
structure lacked historical precedent. In addition, the for-cause removal provision
“clashe[d] with constitutional structure by concentrating power in a unilateral actor
insulated from Presidential control.”
In arriving at its holding, the majority had to dispose of a Supreme Court precedent
upholding the identical for-cause removal language. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute protecting the
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commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from termination except for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” This was the same standard that
Congress applied to the CFPB director. 
The Seila Law Court, however, distinguished Humphrey’s Executor as involving “a
multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed legislative
and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” As a lone
individual, the CFPB director was not a “body of experts” and could not be considered
non-partisan in the same sense as a commission drawn from both political parties. The
majority further distinguished Humphrey’s Executor on the ground that the CFPB director
exerted significant executive powers, including the authority to promulgate binding rules,
award relief in agency adjudications, and seek “daunting monetary penalties against
private parties” in federal court.
The majority’s strong objections to the powers of the CFPB director dovetailed with its
vision of a unitary executive. Under this view, the Framers deliberately concentrated the
executive power in a strong president, “elected by the entire Nation” and politically
accountable to it. The president could not “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed” or be properly accountable to the people without the ability to dismiss inferior
executive officers at will. If for-cause removal protection for the CFPB director remained
intact, that would leave “significant governmental power in the hands of a single
individual accountable to no one,” insofar as the director was “neither elected by the
people nor meaningfully controlled (through the threat of removal) by someone who”
was. Consequently, the Court struck down the for-cause removal protection for the CFPB
director, sparing the CFPB but making the director terminable at will.
In short, the Seila Law case articulates an uncompromising commitment to a unitary
executive. The majority opinion’s dogmatic tone and unwillingness to engage with
countervailing arguments, however, weakened the opinion’s persuasive force.
II. Independent Financial Regulators and
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Their Importance
Upon reading, the majority opinion comes off as hermetically sealed and deaf to contrary
facts. Ironically, the conservative majority abjured a strict textualist approach to
constitutional interpretation because the Constitution does not contain a removal clause.
The majority ignored other text in the Constitution that undermined the Court’s chosen
unitary executive theory. It shrugged at Humphrey’s Executor’s lack of distinction
between single agency heads and multimember commissions. Most curiously, the
majority’s reasoning embraced history as one of its two pillars, yet was silent about the
nation’s long tradition of independent federal financial regulators. This tradition has
persisted for reasons that are vital to protecting the nation’s economic health.
A. The Constitution Contemplates Joint Decision-making
Between the President and Congress on Executive Branch
Design
In Seila Law, the majority opinion took new and aggressive steps to consolidate the
removal power in the president and to limit Congress’s ability to constrain that power.
However, the majority’s sole reliance on Article II as the basis of that holding was
misplaced. 
The majority disregarded at least two separate constitutional provisions that establish
Congress’s central role in executive branch design. The Necessary and Proper Clause in
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” Congress’s enumerated powers and
“all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.” Similarly, the Appointments Clause empowers
Congress to “establish[ ]” the principal officers of the executive branch “by law.” Only
when Congress creates an office may the president fill that office by appointing a
principal officer, and only then may the appointment go forward upon the advice and
consent of the Senate. Thus, the Constitution makes clear that Congress creates the
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position of every principal officer of the executive branch and specifies the powers of
each office. 
The Constitution further places checks and balances on these powers. Through the veto
power, the president can influence the institutional design decisions of Congress and
ultimately reject them, subject only to congressional override. Similarly, the Senate,
through its powers of advice and consent, can reject presidential nominations of principal
officers. 
Thus, the Constitution contemplates a symbiotic relationship, in which decisions about
the features of agencies and agency leadership are the joint product of agreement
between the president and Congress, through statutory enactments they both approve.
Deeming Congress and the president best-equipped to decide on the executive branch’s
design, the Framers largely left decisions on institutional design to those two branches,
not the judiciary. Over the succeeding two-plus centuries, this constitutional framework
has given Congress and the president the flexibility they need to customize the design of
executive branch agencies to the exigencies of the time.
B. This Nation’s Tradition of Independent Financial
Regulators Goes Back More Than Two Hundred Years
Against this constitutional backdrop, Congress and the president have repeatedly
enacted legislation insulating federal banking regulators from political influence by
Congress and the White House. That history stretches back to the earliest days of the
Republic, when Congress located the Treasury Department outside of the “executive
departments”  and decreed that the comptroller of the Treasury’s settlements of public
accounts were “final and conclusive” and thus immune from reversal by the president.
Next followed Congress’s creation of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816,
which by statute had twenty-five directors, only five of whom could be appointed or
removed by the president. 
Later, during the Civil War, Congress created the Office of the Comptroller of the
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Currency (OCC) at President Lincoln’s request to help fund the war. The OCC was the
first federal banking regulator and ushered in the modern era of federal banking
oversight. Originally, the president could only remove the comptroller with the consent of
the Senate. But Congress revised that provision one year later to allow termination by
the president acting alone, on the condition of “reasons to be communicated by him to
the Senate.”
Similar enactments ensued in the twentieth century. The 1913 legislation creating the
Federal Reserve System stipulated that the governors of the Federal Reserve Board
could only be removed for cause. In the Banking Act of 1933, Congress and the
president created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and named the
Comptroller of the Currency as one of its directors. The creation of the CFPB followed
seventy-seven years later.
Congress and the president, acting together, accomplished agency independence by
enacting institutional features to lessen political pressure on federal banking regulators.
Today, each of those regulators—the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the OCC, and
most recently the CFPB—has independent funding, which exempts them from the
congressional appropriations process. Congress and the president also gave the
leadership of each federal banking regulator a fixed term exceeding five years and
shielded the agency heads from firing at will without accountability to Congress. Federal
banking regulators are similarly exempt from review of economically significant
regulations by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (more
commonly known as OIRA). Some federal banking regulators enjoy even more
independence—ranging from freedom from an annual audit by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to the absence of budget caps—than the CFPB.
Federal banking regulators are not the only independent federal agencies. In the broader
financial regulatory realm, count the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the FTC, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). While the guarantees of independence that Congress bestowed on
these bodies vary by agency, they all enjoy protection from political pressure.
Constitutionalizing Financial Instability – The University of Chicago Law Review Online
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/27/seila-mccoy/[9/21/2020 8:53:07 AM]
Independent federal agencies also abound outside the financial sphere: they include the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Social
Security Administration, to name a few. In 2010, Justice Breyer counted fully forty-eight
independent federal agencies with heads removable strictly for cause. These agencies
have independence for a reason: to ensure that decisions in the best long-term interest
of the country are made based on impartial technical expertise.
C. Independent Agency Status Helps Ensure That
Decisions Requiring Technical Know-How Are Made in
the Nation’s Long-Term Interest
The venerable tradition of independent federal agencies exists for good reason. In each
case, Congress and the president wanted decisions by those agencies to be grounded in
technical or scientific expertise, free from inordinate political pressure by Congress, by
the White House, and by vested interests. In financial policy, the two branches further
sought to avoid the distortions to the national economy that could result if a future
president or Congress interfered with agency decision-making in order to boost their
short-term electoral prospects. This freed federal financial regulators to act in the long-
term interest of the economy, instead of being captive to the short-term election horizon
of elected officials. The fear was that otherwise, political manipulation could wreak havoc
on business and the financial system. In view of that fear, it comes as no surprise that
most of the nation’s independent financial regulators were created in response to a
financial crisis: the Panic of 1907, in the case of the Federal Reserve System; the Great
Depression, in the case of the FDIC, FTC, and SEC; and the Great Recession, in the
case of the CFPB. Congress bestowed them with independence in order to force
politicians and regulators to take a long-term view of the nation’s economic, financial,
and monetary stability.
When presidents lean on financial regulators to bolster their political prospects, usually
their aim is to loosen credit to fuel spending and juice the economy. As alluring as this
temptation is, Congress for decades has opted to curb it because relaxing credit
standards can result in reckless lending that threatens financial stability. A short-term but
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unsustainable credit-fueled asset bubble can result in a subsequent debilitating
economic crash. Indeed, history has shown that the worst financial crises for centuries
have been caused by real estate bubbles financed by loose credit.
In part to ensure decentralization of power throughout the administrative state, Congress
and the president delegated the control of credit expansion to a variety of institutions,
including the Federal Reserve System, the SEC, and the CFPB. Monetary policy, for
instance, is the domain of the Federal Reserve System. Its main monetary tool consists
of moving the target for the federal funds rate (which is the interest rate that banks pay to
borrow reserve balances overnight). To stimulate demand for goods and services, the
Federal Reserve can cut the federal funds rate, causing short-term interest rates to fall
and credit to expand. Conversely, if demand overheats, the Federal Reserve can ease
inflationary pressures by raising that rate. Cognizant of these stimulus powers,
presidents have incentives to pressure the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates to
improve their reelection prospects. But Congress restricts the president’s influence over
day-to-day monetary policy by protecting the Federal Reserve’s governors from
immediate dismissal.
The president may also try to lean on a host of federal financial regulators to expand
credit through deregulation of lending standards. Over the years, Congress created
multiple federal financial regulators and entrusted each with duties for the regulation of
credit. For instance, to safeguard the solvency of depository institutions, the Federal
Reserve Board, the FDIC and the OCC administer a host of statutes and rules that affect
the supply and terms of loans by banks and thrifts. Similarly, the CFPB regulates market
conduct for consumer finance and is the only federal agency that regulates the
residential mortgage lending system in its entirety. The FTC and the CFPB share
enforcement for consumer protection violations by nonbank lenders. Meanwhile, FHFA
supervises the federal mortgage guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Finally, capital markets regulators exert a critical effect on the supply of capital for
lending. The SEC does so as the lead regulator for asset-backed securitizations and
corporate debt issuances. The SEC and the CFTC also share oversight of credit default
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swaps, which protect bond investors from defaults.
In each case, Congress balanced the constitutional requirement that the president take
care that the laws be faithfully executed with the need to shield credit and monetary
expansion from political interference. Protection from at-will termination has been
Congress’s preferred mechanism to achieve this balance for nearly 150 years.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the legitimacy of independent agencies by
upholding the constitutionality of for-cause removal provisions enacted by Congress.
Humphrey’s Executor, of course, confirmed the legality of such a provision in the context
of the FTC. Wiener v. United States forbade the president from terminating members of
the War Claims Commission at will. Morrison v. Olson held that an independent counsel
empowered to investigate and prosecute high-level federal officials, including the
president, could only be removed for cause. Even Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which struck down a rare instance of double-
layer for-cause protection, made the members of a federal accounting board terminable
at will by SEC commissioners, but preserved the for-cause removal protection enjoyed
by every SEC commissioner. As the majority in Free Enterprise Fund explained, it did not
“take issue with for-cause limitations in general.”
This account shows the heavily distorted nature of the majority’s portrayal of history in
Seila Law. The majority ignored the deeply embedded tradition of independent federal
agencies in this country. It ignored the substantial Supreme Court precedent upholding
that tradition and for-cause removal restrictions in particular. The majority opinion also
was blind to the many ways in which independent agencies and the CFPB specifically
are politically accountable.
D. The CFPB Remains Accountable through Numerous
Other Means
In Seila Law, the majority insisted that the “CFPB Director has no boss, peers, or voters
to report to.” But contrary to that assertion, the CFPB is politically and judicially
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accountable. Both Congress and the president exert oversight of the Bureau through
multiple other means.
First, it is critical to stress a general point: that independent agency heads with for-cause
protection do in fact answer to the president. Those chiefs are not immune from
presidential discharge for any and all reasons. To the contrary, they face termination
either “for cause” (as in the case of Federal Reserve governors) or for “inefficiency,
neglect, or malfeasance” (as in the case of FTC commissioners and, until recently, the
director of the CFPB). Any independent agency head who violates the law can be fired
by the president under this standard. For this reason, the for-cause standard in fact
allows presidents to discharge their Article II duty to “take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” Thus, it was blatantly false for the majority to maintain the CFPB director was
“accountable to no one” in contravention of Article II, and made Seila Law wrongly
decided.
Turning specifically to the CFPB, the Bureau is accountable to all three branches in a
multitude of other ways. The Dodd-Frank Act commands the director to appear twice
annually before the Senate Banking Committee and the House Committees on Financial
Services and Energy and Commerce. In advance of those hearings, the Bureau must
submit to the Committees and the president a comprehensive report on topics ranging
from regulatory obstacles and objectives to budgetary justifications, as well as analysis of
past and anticipated agency actions. Meanwhile, the GAO conducts an annual audit of
the CFPB, and the Bureau also undergoes full review by the Federal Reserve’s Inspector
General. Congress is free to exercise further oversight of the CFPB, and it has not
hesitated to do so, judging from the number of times Congress has summoned CFPB
officials to testify over the years. Ultimately, Congress can discipline the agency through
legislation or the Congressional Review Act if it disapproves of the Bureau’s decisions.
Congress’s decisions to strike down the CFPB’s indirect auto lending guidance and its
mandatory arbitration rule are recent cases where Congress flexed that muscle.
The CFPB also operates under a hard budget constraint that other federal banking
regulators do not face. The Dodd-Frank Act caps the agency’s budget at 12 percent of
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the Federal Reserve System’s fiscal year 2009 annual operating budget, indexed for
inflation. In this way, Congress exerts the power of the purse on a continuing basis for
the CFPB—something not done for any other bank regulator.
Other potent accountability mechanisms constrain the CFPB. Its enforcement actions
and rulemakings are subject to judicial challenge and reversal in Article III courts.  And
unlike with any other federal financial regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) can veto Bureau rulemakings that jeopardize financial stability. Also unlike most
federal financial regulators, the CFPB must conduct cost-benefit analysis of its rules
under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Against this background, several criticisms of the CFPB director as excessively powerful
by the Seila Law majority are pure hyperbole. Take, for instance, the assertion that the
CFPB “Director may unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief
in administrative adjudications.” The director’s enforcement decisions are subject to
judicial review and so, if challenged, are neither unilateral nor final. Indeed, the very fact
that the Seila Law case resulted in partial Supreme Court reversal is a powerful
testament to the accountability exercised by judicial review.
In another instance of hyperbole, the majority avowed that the CFPB director has “the
power to seek daunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf of the
United States in federal court” and “levy[ ] kneebuckling penalties against private
citizens.” However, the director’s enforcement authority in this respect is no larger than
the civil money penalty authority of the federal prudential banking regulators or the SEC.
Singling the CFPB out for this criticism when other federal financial regulators wield the
same power smacks of a special, but unvoiced, distrust of regulators entrusted with
consumer protection.
In a last exaggeration, the majority asserted that the CFPB director “may unilaterally,
without meaningful supervision, issue final regulations . . .” (emphasis in original). Once
again, however, CFPB rules are subject to the same Administrative Procedure Act
review by Article III courts as other federal agency rules. Further, Congress can
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countermand new CFPB rules under the Congressional Review Act. FSOC can reverse
any Bureau rules that threaten financial stability. Given these multiple avenues for
reversal, the CFPB in no way acts unilaterally when it promulgates rules. Nor are CFPB
rules final as a practical matter until those review processes have played out. Finally, the
Hill holds the ultimate power over CFPB rulemaking, because it can always override
CFPB rules by statutory enactment, with no time limit. 
In all of these ways, in sum, the CFPB is politically accountable. Nevertheless, the Seila
Law majority put on blinders and ignored these safeguards of accountability. Having
done so, the majority damned the Bureau as a law unto itself. That raises the question: if
the Supreme Court was willing to compromise the CFPB’s independence and override
Congress in the process, is it poised to do so for other federal financial regulators as
well?
III. Does Seila Law Set a Dangerous
Precedent?
Seila Law is the first Supreme Court case to curtail the independence of a federal
financial regulator. Will it be the last? Language in that case gives reason for concern.
The majority opinion made no promises in that regard. All the majority was willing to do
was to refrain from overturning past removal precedent in the Seila Law case itself. Thus,
the majority said: “While we do not revisit Humphrey’s Executor or any other precedent
today, we decline to elevate it into a freestanding invitation for Congress to impose
additional restrictions on the President’s removal authority.” This less-than-reassuring
language left the door open for reversing the Supreme Court’s for-cause removal
precedent in the future.
Two members of the five-justice majority would have gone further and overturned
Humphrey’s Executor outright. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Gorsuch, argued that leaving independent agencies “in place . . . subverts political
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accountability and threatens individual liberty.” They also would have outlawed the entire
CFPB as unconstitutional. In view of these extreme stances, it is hard to read this
concurrence as anything other than a call for abolition of independent federal agencies
across the board.
Beyond that, all five members of the majority signaled constitutional objections to other
vital guard rails of CFPB independence. They objected to the Bureau’s independent
funding. They objected to its single-director structure. They objected to the director’s five-
year term, which exceeds the term of a president. Even more disturbingly, they attacked
Congress’s designation of the CFPB as an “independent Bureau,” because by virtue of
their decision, the CFPB head now must “implement the President’s policies upon pain of
removal.” If this view were entombed as constitutional law, rulemakings by all federal
financial regulators could be subject to OIRA (read: White House) review.
These broadside attacks are unnerving for anyone who values independent financial
regulation and long-term economic stability. If the Federal Reserve Board lost
independent funding and the governors lost their fourteen-year terms and their protection
against removal save for cause, imagine the economic havoc a president could cause
who was hell-bent on stimulating the economy through loose credit to boost the chance
of reelection. The same goes for the FDIC. The Comptroller of the Currency and the
director of the FHFA, as single agency heads, not multimember commissions, are in an
even more precarious position. (Indeed, the Supreme Court just granted certiorari to
examine the constitutionality of for-cause removal protection for the FHFA director).
It is not clear whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kavanaugh have the
appetite to wholesale erase the independent status of the Federal Reserve Board and
other federal financial regulators. In a hopeful sign of moderation and concern to avoid
judicial overreach, they did vote for severance and thus kept the CFPB intact.
Furthermore, Seila Law rests on a shaky analysis of history and case law, making it
vulnerable to limitation or reversal if and when the philosophical configuration of the
Supreme Court reverses.
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Still, the future remains unsettled. Even if a conservative Court were unwilling to abolish
independent agencies outright, it could achieve the same effect by picking away at
attributes of agency autonomy, for instance, by striking down independent funding here
and long fixed terms there. The upcoming Supreme Court decision in the FHFA director
case will be telling, particularly if by that time mortgage delinquencies have spiked in the
wake of the global pandemic and high unemployment. Will the Court be prepared to
allow the president to fire the FHFA director for refusing to approve lax mortgage credit?
Has the Court boxed itself in to that result with Seila Law? Or will the Court hold the line
against rash political pressure by the White House that could have ruinous long-term
economic consequences?
It is all too easy for first-term presidents, faced with possible defeat at the polls, to put
their short-term career interests ahead of the long-term financial stability of the nation.
Agency independence and the job security that comes with for-cause removal increase
the chance that federal financial regulators will act in the people’s best interest by
protecting the economy’s long-term health. By constitutionalizing the president’s
prerogative to fire the CFPB director for refusing to relax credit to produce a short-term
boom, the Seila Law decision tread a dangerous path for the nation’s financial security.
* * *
Patricia A. McCoy is the Liberty Mutual Insurance Professor at Boston College Law
School. Professor McCoy previously was a senior official at the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.
* * *
Click here to return to the Seila Law series main page.
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